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Abstract
The paper concerns a dynamic model of influence in which agents have to make
a yes-no decision. Each agent has an initial opinion, which he may change during
different phases of interaction, due to mutual influence among agents. The influence
mechanism is assumed to be stochastic and to follow a Markov chain. In the
paper, we investigate a model of influence based on aggregation functions. Each
agent modifies his opinion independently of the others, by aggregating the current
opinion of all agents, possibly including himself. We provide a general analysis of
convergence in the aggregation model and give more practical conditions based on
influential players. We show that the process of influence converges always to one
of the two consensus states, and there may exist other terminal classes, which are
either cyclic or union of Boolean lattices. We give sufficient conditions for avoiding
these additional terminal classes, based on properties of the graph of influence and
influential players. We also introduce the notion of influential coalition and show
that it can fully describe terminal classes. Some important families of aggregation
functions are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The concepts of interaction and influence in networks are studied in several scientific fields,
e.g., in psychology, sociology, economics, mathematics. In the game-theoretical literature,
one-step models of influence appeared already more than fifty years ago. For a short
survey of cooperative and noncooperative approaches to influence, see, e.g., Grabisch and
Rusinowska (2010c). Very important contributions to a study of influence phenomena
can be found in the literature on dynamic aspects of influence. An overview of dynamic
models of imitation and social influence is provided, e.g., in Jackson (2008); see also
Rusinowska (2010) for a general survey of different approaches to influence. The present
paper investigates a new approach to influence based on aggregation functions. Before
focusing on the model in question, first we briefly survey some selected literature on
dynamic models of interaction and influence.
1.1 Literature on dynamic models of interaction and influence
One of the leading models of opinion formation has been introduced by DeGroot (1974).
In his model, individuals in a society start with initial opinions on a subject. The inter-
action patterns are described by a stochastic matrix whose entry on row j and column k
represents the weight ‘that agent j places on the current belief of agent k in forming j’s
belief for the next period’. The beliefs are updated over time. Results in Markov chain
theory are easily adapted to the model. Several works in the network literature deal
with the DeGroot model and its variations. In particular, Jackson (2008) and Golub and
Jackson (2010) examine a model, in which agents communicate in a social network and
update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ opinions.
One of the issues in the DeGroot framework that these authors deal with concerns neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for convergence of the social influence matrix and reaching
a consensus; see additionally Berger (1981). Jackson (2008) also examines the speed of
convergence of beliefs, and Golub and Jackson (2010) analyze in the context of the De-
Groot model whether consensus beliefs are “correct”, i.e., whether the beliefs converge
to the right probability, expectation, etc. The authors consider a sequence of societies,
where each society is strongly connected and convergent, and described by its updating
matrix. In each social network of the sequence, the belief of each player converges to the
consensus limit belief. There is a true state of nature, and the sequence of networks is
wise if the consensus limit belief converges in probability to the true state as the size of
society grows.
Several other generalizations of the DeGroot model can be found in the literature,
e.g., models in which the updating of beliefs can vary in time and circumstances; see
e.g. DeMarzo et al. (2003), Krause (2000), Lorenz (2005), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990,
1997). In particular, in the model of information transmission and opinion formation by
DeMarzo et al. (2003), the agents in a network try to estimate some unknown parameter,
which allows updating to vary over time, i.e., an agent may place more or less weight on
his own belief over time. The authors study the case of multidimensional opinions, in
which each agent has a vector of beliefs. They show that, in fact, the individuals’ opinions
can often be well approximated by a one-dimensional line, where an agent’s position on
the line determines his position on all issues. Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1997) study
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a similar framework, in which social attitudes depend on the attitudes of neighbors and
evolve over time. In their model, agents start with initial attitudes and then mix in some
of their neighbors’ recent attitudes with their starting attitudes.
The fact that decisions of individuals are often influenced by decisions of other indi-
viduals is also stressed by Lo´pez-Pintado (2008), who studies a network of interacting
agents with actions determined by the actions of their neighbors. Lo´pez-Pintado and
Watts (2008) study how social influence determines collective outcomes in a large popu-
lation of individuals making binary decisions. Influence networks and the role of social
influence in determining distinct collective outcomes is also examined in Lo´pez-Pintado
(2010).
Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2009) consider an overlapping-generations model in
which agents, that represent some dynasties forming a community, take binary actions.
The state of the community contains the yes-no actions of all dynasties. In each period
‘the parent’ is randomly selected from the community and replaced by the ‘child’, and the
higher the number of agents that have adopted the yes-action, the greater the propensity
of the child to do the same. The overlapping-generations model with the individual
decisions generates a Markov process. In particular, the authors relate their framework
to a certain model of stochastic recruitment of ants (Kirman (1993)), where the behavior
of the ants (also related to some economic examples) is modelled as a Markov process.
Kirman et al. (1986) consider an economy with a stochastic communication between
agents. Coalitions can form only between linked players, so the admissible coalitions are
stochastic, and the economy is represented by a stochastic graph.
There is a numerous literature on social learning, in particular, in the context of social
networks; see, e.g., Banerjee (1992), Ellison (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995),
Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001), Gale and Kariv (2003), Celen and Kariv (2004), Banerjee
and Fudenberg (2004). In general, in social learning models agents observe choices over
time and update their beliefs accordingly, which is different from the model analyzed in
our paper, where the choices depend on the influence of others.
Finally, we like to mention the percolation theory (see, e.g., Broadbent and Ham-
mersley (1957), Kesten (1982)) which describes the behavior of connected clusters in a
random graph, and the Ising and Potts models in statistical mechanics. The Ising model
(Lenz (1920), Ising (1925)) consists of discrete variables called spins that can be in one of
two states. The spins are placed on a lattice or graph, where each spin interacts at most
with its nearest neighbors. The Potts model (Potts (1952)) is a certain generalization of
the Ising model.
1.2 The present paper
In the present paper, we extent a framework of influence studied in Grabisch and Rusi-
nowska (2009, 2010a,b, 2011a,b), to a dynamic model of influence based on aggregation
functions. In the basic model (Hoede and Bakker (1982)), agents make a yes-no decision
on a certain issue, and while each agent has his preliminary opinion (inclination), he
may decide differently from that inclination, due to influence between agents. A trans-
formation from the agents’ inclinations to their decisions is represented by an influence
function. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a), we introduce several tools for analyzing
influence in the yes-no model (e.g., influence indices, concepts of follower and kernel),
3
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and study several examples of influence functions that model typical real-life behaviors.
The model is extended to a framework in which every agent has a totally ordered set of
possible actions (Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b)), and to a model with a continuum
of actions (Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b)). In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009), we
show that the framework of influence is more general than a cooperative model of com-
mand games presented in Hu and Shapley (2003a,b). This line of research is continued
in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011a), where the exact relations between the key concepts
of the influence model and the framework of command games are established.
The present paper extends our previous research in several aspects. While influence
functions considered so far were deterministic and the framework was a decision process
after a single step of influence, we consider now a dynamic influence mechanism which
is assumed to be stochastic and to follow a Markov chain. The main contribution of the
present paper to the literature on influence is the introduction and study of the influence
framework based on aggregation functions. In our model, each agent modifies his opinion
independently of the others, by aggregating the current opinion of all agents, possibly
including himself. We provide a general analysis of convergence in the aggregation model
and give more practical conditions based on influential players. We show that the process
of influence converges always to one of the two consensus states, and there may exist other
terminal classes, which are either cyclic or union of Boolean lattices. Moreover, we give
sufficient conditions for excluding these additional terminal classes, based on properties of
the graph of influence and influential players. We also introduce the notion of influential
coalition and show that it can fully describe terminal classes.
Despite the existence of numerous studies on influence in social networks, we are
not aware of any work in which the aggregation of opinions was different from using a
weighted arithmetic mean (convex combination). We briefly discuss related literature on
aggregation models in Section 5.
2 The deterministic and stochastic models of influ-
ence
We consider a set N := {1, . . . , n} of agents having to make a yes-no decision for approving
a bill, a project, a candidate, etc. (typically these agents form a committee). Each agent
is supposed to have an initial opinion (called inclination), but during the different phases
of the discussion, agents may change their initial opinion due to mutual influence among
agents.
We consider first a deterministic model of influence (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2010a).
Supposing that S is the set of agents having inclination ‘yes’, we denote by B(S) the set of
‘yes’-agents after one step of influence. B : 2N → 2N is a fixed function, called influence
function, which captures all possible situations of influence. It is important to note that
to a given situation, depicted by the set of ‘yes’-inclined agents, after influence follows
always the same outcome (set of agents voting ‘yes’). Since the function B is not directly
interpretable, many notions have been proposed in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a)
to ‘read’ it, as for example the influence index of a coalition upon an agent, follower
functions and kernels. We briefly describe the two last ones.
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Given an influence function B, the associated follower function FB : 2
N → 2N assigns
to every coalition S the set of its followers, i.e., agents who always follow the opinion (‘yes’
or ‘no’) of agents in S, provided they are unanimous (see a thorough study of follower
functions in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011a)). Formally,
FB(S) = {i ∈ N | [B(S
′) ∋ i, ∀S ′ ⊇ S]&[B(S ′) 6∋ i, ∀S ′ ⊆ N \ S]}.
FB(S) = ∅ means that coalition S has no real influence on the agents. We say that S is
a kernel if FB(S) 6= ∅ but FB(S
′) = ∅ for every S ′ ⊂ S. It means that S is an irreducible
group of agents being influential, because if an agent leaves this group, it looses all its
followers.
The above notions are too rigid to be of real interest, since it is unlikely that an agent
will always react the same way to the opinion of the others. Hence, we are naturally
led to consider stochastic influence functions to introduce some flexibility in the model.
Given a situation S (set of ‘yes’-inclined voters), there is a certain probability bS,T that
the set of ‘yes’-voters after one step of influence is T . If we assume that the process of
influence may iterate (several rounds in the discussion), we obtain a stochastic process,
depicting the evolution of the coalition of ‘yes’-agents along time. We make here the
following simplifying assumptions, which seem reasonable in our context of influence:
(i) The process is Markovian, i.e., the probability bS,T depends on S (the present
situation) and T (the future situation), and not on the whole history.
(ii) The process is stationary, i.e., bS,T is constant over time.
States of this finite Markovian process are therefore all subsets S ⊆ N , representing
the set of ‘yes’-agents; its transition matrix B := [bS,T ]S,T⊆N is a 2
n × 2n row-stochastic
matrix.
The above two assumptions make the analysis of convergence relatively easy, since
one can use the classical results of Markov chains theory. We will not detail these results
here, since our analysis of convergence, done in the particular case of aggregation models
described in the next section, follows another way.
To the transition matrix B we associate a graph Γ = (2N , E), called the transition
graph, where E is the set of arcs. Γ is a directed graph (digraph), whose vertices are
all possible coalitions, and an arc (S, T ) from state S to state T exists if bS,T > 0.
One can consider also valued arcs, where the value of an arc (S, T ) is simply bS,T . The
transition graph gives a convenient qualitative view of the process, as well as insights on
the convergence. To this end, we introduce some terminology. A path in Γ from S to
T is a sequence of states S = S0, S1, S2, . . . , Sk−1, Sk = T such that (Si, Si+1) ∈ E for
i = 0, . . . , k − 1. A nonempty collection C of states is a class if
(i) either C = {S}, and there is no state T such that there exists a path from S to T
and from T to S;
(ii) or for every distinct S, T ∈ C, there is a path from S to T and from T to S, and
C is maximal for this property (i.e., any addition of a new state in C makes this
property false).
5
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A class is either transient or terminal. It is transient if there are states S ∈ C and T 6∈ C
such that (S, T ) ∈ E (we call it an outgoing arc). Therefore, a terminal class has no
outgoing arc. It means that once the process has entered such a class, it will never exit
from it. In other words, the process converges always in one of the terminal classes. If a
terminal class is reduced to a single state, we call it a terminal state. The aim is therefore
to find all terminal classes and terminal states.
We give several examples illustrating the above notions.
Example 1 (The guru influence function). The guru influence function is a deter-
ministic influence function defined as follows. Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular agent called
the guru, who has the property that every agent always follows the opinion of the guru.
Therefore the influence function is given by:
Gur[
ek](S) :=
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S
, ∀S ⊆ N.
For instance, the transition matrix of the guru function for n = 3 and k˜ = 1 is
Gur[1] =
∅ 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

1 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

where each “blank” entry means zero, and its associated graph is given in Figure 1. One
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Figure 1: The graph of the guru function Gur[1] for n = 3
can see that ∅ and 123 are terminal states. The convergence of the process associated to
the guru function is extremely simple: it converges in one step to either N or ∅, depending
whether the opinion of the guru is ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
6
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Example 2 (The majority influence function). One of the natural ways of making
a decision in an influence environment is to decide according to the inclination of the
majority. In other words, if the majority of agents has a ‘yes’ inclination, then all agents
decide ‘yes’, and if not, then all agents decide ‘no’. Let n ≥ q > ⌊n
2
⌋. The majority
influence function Maj[q] is given by
Maj[q](S) :=
{
N, if |S| ≥ q
∅, if |S| < q
, ∀S ⊆ N.
Note that this function is also deterministic. The transition graph of the majority influ-
ence function for n = 3 and q = 2 is given in Figure 2. Obviously, ∅ and 123 are terminal
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Figure 2: The graph of the majority function Maj[2] for n = 3
states. Here also, the convergence is reached in one step.
Example 3 (The stochastic mass psychology function). Let ε denote either ‘yes’
or ‘no’, and ε¯ denote the opposite of ε. Mass psychology influence means that if there is a
sufficient number of agents with opinion ε, they will attract some agents with inclination ε¯
and make them change their opinion. Formally, this can be expressed as follows (Grabisch
and Rusinowska, 2010a): Let n ≥ q > ⌊n
2
⌋. The mass psychology function Mass[q] satisfies
if |S| ≥ q, then Mass[q](S) ⊇ S, and if |N \ S| ≥ q, then Mass[q](S) ⊆ S,
where we recall that S is the set of ’yes’-agents.
Here it is natural to consider a stochastic influence function to model the fact that
some agents may change their opinion. For instance, the stochastic mass psychology
7
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function (with uniform distribution) (n = 3, q = 2) is given by the following matrix:
Mass[2] =
∅.5 1.5 2.5 12 3.5 13 23 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123

1 1 2 12 3 13 23 123
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
1

(1)
where a “blank” entry means zero. The associated graph is given in Figure 3. Again, ∅
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
Figure 3: The graph of the stochastic mass psychology function Mass[2] for n = 3
and 123 are terminal states. For the stochastic mass psychology function in the general
case, with n > 3 and q > ⌊n
2
⌋, the following is easy to establish: If the initial state S(0)
satisfies |S(0)| ≥ q, then it converges to N with probability 1 (under some mild conditions
on the transition matrix). If |S(0)| ≤ n− q, then it converges to ∅ with probability 1. In
all other cases, nothing can be said in general.
3 Modelling influence by aggregation functions
The stochastic influence function is a very general model, whose only restrictions are
the Markovian and stationarity assumptions. The price to pay for this generality is the
exponential complexity of the model: the transition matrix has size 2n×2n, which makes
it usable only for a small number of agents.
This motivates the search for subfamilies of polynomial complexity, yet enough general
to cover most of real situations. We propose here such a family, whose basic idea is very
simple. It assumes that each agent modifies his opinion independently of the other agents,
by aggregating the current opinion of all agents, possibly including himself. The precise
way of aggregating opinions is characteristic to each agent, so that agents may have all
different procedures for aggregating. The aggregation procedure is numerical, coding ‘yes’
8
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by 1 and ‘no’ by 0. The result of aggregation is a number between 0 and 1, representing
the probability that the considered agent says ‘yes’. For example, the simplest procedure
of aggregation is to count the number of ‘yes’-agents and to divide by n: the more agents
say ‘yes’, the more you are inclined to say ‘yes’. One can also make a weighted count,
putting weights on agents1, or imagine any kind of procedure, provided it is rational in
the following sense: take S, S ′ two sets of ‘yes’-agents, and suppose that S ⊆ S ′. Then
the probability to say ‘yes’ for the S ′ situation should be at least equal to the probability
for the S situation. This assumption supposes that influence is “positive”, that is, agents
tends to follow the trend. One can consider as well “negative” influence, where agents
modify their opinion in reaction to the opinion of the others: the more agents say ‘yes’,
the more they are inclined to say ‘no’. In this case, just the opposite assumption on the
aggregation procedure must be taken. In the rest of the paper, we suppose that we deal
only with positive influence.
Definition 1. An n-place aggregation function is any mapping A : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] satis-
fying
(i) A(0, . . . , 0) = 0, A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 (boundary conditions)
(ii) If x ≤ x′ then A(x) ≤ A(x′) (nondecreasingness).
Aggregation functions are well-studied and there exist many families of them: all kinds
of means (geometric, harmonic, quasi-arithmetic) and their weighted version, weighted
ordered averages, any combination of minimum and maximum (lattice polynomials or
Sugeno integrals), Choquet integrals, triangular norms, copulas, etc. (see Grabisch et al.
(2009) and Section 4.6).
To each agent i ∈ N we associate an aggregation function Ai, specifying the way
agent i modifies his opinion from the opinion of the other agents and himself. Specifically,
supposing that S is the set of agents saying ‘yes’, we compute x = (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)),
where 1S is the characteristic vector of S, i.e., (1S)j = 1 if j ∈ S and (1S)j = 0 otherwise.
We denote by A := (A1, . . . , An) the vector of aggregation functions, and may use the
shorthand x = A(1S).
Vector x indicates the probability of each agent to say ‘yes’ after influence. Consider-
ing that these probabilities are independent among agents, we find that the probability
of transition from the yes-coalition S to the yes-coalition T is
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
xi
∏
i6∈T
(1− xi), ∀S, T ⊆ N, (2)
which determines B. It follows that deterministic models correspond to aggregation
functions satisfying Ai(1S) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , hence they reduce to Boolean functions
Bi : 2
N → {0, 1} which are nondecreasing and nonconstant. Conversely, any deterministic
influence model B : 2N → 2N satisfying B(∅) = ∅, B(N) = N and being nondecreasing
is a particular aggregation model, with nondecreasing nonconstant Boolean functions
B1, . . . , Bn defined by Bi(1S) = 1 if B(S) ∋ i, and 0 otherwise.
Let us show that all our previous examples can be cast into this framework.
1These weights reflect to which extent an agent takes into account the opinion of the others. For
example, in the model of Lo´pez-Pintado (2010), each agent looks only at the opinion of his neighbors.
Note also that if two agents cannot communicate, this can be represented by zero weights.
9
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• The guru and the majority influence functions being deterministic and satisfying
the above conditions, it follows that they belong to our aggregation model. For both
examples, aggregation functions of all agents are identical. For the guru influence
function, we have Ai(1S) = 1 if S ∋ k˜ and 0 otherwise, while for the majority
influence function we have Ai(1S) = 1 if |S| ≥ q, and 0 otherwise.
• Stochastic mass psychology functions can be suitably modelled by aggregation func-
tions. For this, one has to specify for each S ⊆ N the probabilities of transition.
If the set S of ‘yes’ players satisfies |S| > q, then there is some probability that
players in N \ S (‘no’ players) become ‘yes’ players (and similarly if S is the set
of ‘no’ players). Suppose that for each situation (S ⊆ N , ε =‘yes’ or ‘no’), the
probability pS,εi that player i ∈ N \ S changes his opinion is specified, and that
players in N \ S change independently their opinion. Then this is equivalent to an
aggregation model defined as follows, for every S ⊆ N :
Ai(1S) =

1, if i ∈ S and |S| ≥ q
pS,yesi , if i ∈ N \ S and |S| ≥ q
0, if i ∈ N \ S and |N \ S| ≥ q
p
N\S,no
i , if i ∈ S and |N \ S| ≥ q.
For example, the transition matrix (1) can be recovered as follows:
A1(1 0 0) = 0.5, A2(1 0 0) = 0, A3(1 0 0) = 0
A1(0 1 0) = 0, A2(0 1 0) = 0.5, A3(0 1 0) = 0
A1(0 0 1) = 0, A2(0 0 1) = 0, A3(0 0 1) = 0.5
A1(1 1 0) = 1, A2(1 1 0) = 1, A3(1 1 0) = 0.5
A1(1 0 1) = 1, A2(1 0 1) = 0.5, A3(1 0 1) = 1
A1(0 1 1) = 0.5, A2(0 1 1) = 1, A3(0 1 1) = 1.
A natural question is then: when a stochastic influence function does not belong to
the class of aggregation models? It suffices that the modification of opinion of agents is
correlated: suppose n = 2, and the two agents are perfectly positively correlated. Then
b1,∅ = b1,12 = 1/2, b1,1 = b1,2 = 0, and similarly for agent 2. From (2), b1,1 = b1,2 = 0
implies that A1(11) = A2(11) = 0, which makes b1,∅ = b1,12 = 1/2 impossible.
The following notions will reveal to be central in our analysis.
Definition 2. (i) Let Ai be the aggregation function of agent i. Agent j ∈ N is
influential2 in Ai if Ai(1j) > 0 and Ai(1N\j) < 1.
(ii) The graph of influence is a directed graph GA1,...,An = (N, E) whose set of nodes
is N , and there is an arc (j, i) from j to i if j is influential in Ai. We denote its
undirected version by G0A1,...,An.
2This notion is close to the notion of essential attribute in multiattribute utility theory, see Keeney
and Raiffa (1976).
10
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We comment on these two definitions. Roughly speaking, an agent j is influential for
agent i if the opinion of j matters for i. Indeed, supposing i 6= j, even if everybody says
‘no’ but agent j, there is a positive probability that agent i changes his mind due to the
influence of j. Note that we require also that the same happens when ‘no’ is replaced by
‘yes’, since the vector 1N\j depicts a situation where every agent says ‘yes’, except agent
j. This requirement is natural if we do not want any asymmetry of treatment between
‘yes’ and ‘no’. Note also that the monotonicity of aggregation functions entails that if j
is influential in Ai, then Ai(1S) > 0 whenever S ∋ j and Ai(1S) < 1 if S 6∋ j. Also, if all
Ai are increasing functions, then the graph of influence is complete with loops.
The graph of influence gives then a clear view of who influences whom. It gives a
formal and simple definition of a notion often used in the literature3. Figure 4 gives the
influential graph of our three examples. The graph of the guru influence function is a
12 5
3 4
67 1 2 3
4 5 6
1 2
3
Figure 4: The graph of influence of the guru influence function (left; n = 7, agent 1
is the guru), the majority influence function (middle, n = 6), and the mass psychology
influence function (right, n = 3, corresponds to the transition matrix (1))
star, showing clearly the roˆle of the guru. By contrast, the two other graphs do not reveal
anything clear on the influence. This is because no particular agent is really influential
in these models. Influence is done only by means of the number of people having the
same opinion. We conclude at this stage that graph of influence, though convenient and
intuitive, cannot explain all phenomena of influence. In Section 4.5 we introduce other
tools able to model this.
4 Convergence in the aggregation model
We provide here a general analysis of convergence of influence functions based on aggre-
gation functions.
4.1 Terminal states
In all examples given above, we can see that the process converges to the consensus states
N or ∅. We call trivial terminal classes the classes {∅} and {N}. Our first result shows
when these are the only terminal states.
3Aracena et al. (2004) define the connection graph, which is very close to ours: there is an arc (i, j)
if the (Boolean) aggregation function Aj depends on the input of i. Our definition is slightly more
restrictive.
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Theorem 1. Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model, with aggregation func-
tions A1, . . . , An. Then
(i) The trivial terminal classes are always terminal classes.
(ii) Coalition S is a terminal state4 if and only if
Ai(1S) = 1 ∀i ∈ S and Ai(1S) = 0 otherwise.
(iii) There are no other terminal states than the trivial terminal classes if and only if
for all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, either there is some i ∈ S such that Ai(1S) < 1 or there is
some i ∈ N \ S such that Ai(1S) > 0.
(iv) There are no other terminal states than the trivial terminal classes if the undirected
graph G0A1,...,An is connected.
(see proof in the appendix)
We make some comments on this result.
• Unsurprisingly, the consensus states are always terminal states. This is reminiscent
of the result of DeGroot for the continuous opinion model.
• Condition (ii) is the basic fact on which the whole theorem is built. In some sense
it means that S forms a subsociety opposed to the rest of the society: if S reach
the ‘yes’ consensus, then it remains in this state, and all other agents unanimously
say ‘no’. Expressing negation of (ii) for every coalition S gives condition (iii). It
does not seem possible to find more handy necessary and sufficient conditions.
• Condition (iv) is very easy to verify and intuitively appealing. Indeed, suppose that
the graph G0A1,...,An is not connected. Then there exists a subset of agents who has
no relation of influence with the remaining agents. Therefore, this subset of agents
may reach a different consensus than the other group.
• Condition (iv) is only a sufficient condition, as shown in Example 4 (ii) below. We
will see later under which conditions it becomes also necessary (see Corollary 2).
• As an immediate consequence of condition (iv), it suffices that there exists i ∈ N
such that all agents j 6= i are influential in Ai. Note that here agent i is the center
of a star in the graph of influence with the arcs going into i, which means that he
takes into account the opinion of all agents.
• The above result says nothing about the existence of terminal classes which are not
reduced to singletons. In Example 5, no nontrivial terminal state can exist since
condition (iii) is satisfied, however a terminal class exists. The analysis of terminal
classes will be done in the next theorem.
Example 4. (i) In the guru example, G0A1,...,An is a star centered on k˜ with the arcs
going from k˜ into all agents (see Figure 4), hence condition (iv) is fulfilled.
4Note that a terminal state is a fixed point of A.
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(ii) In the majority and mass psychology examples, condition (iv) is not fulfilled. Since
the only terminal classes are the trivial ones, this shows that (iv) is not a necessary
condition.
Example 5. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the following aggregation functions:
A1(1 0 0) = 1 A2(1 0 0) = 0.5 A3(1 0 0) = 0
A1(0 1 0) = 0 A2(0 1 0) = 0.5 A3(0 1 0) = 0
A1(0 0 1) = 0 A2(0 0 1) = 0.5 A3(0 0 1) = 0.5
A1(1 1 0) = 1 A2(1 1 0) = 0.5 A3(1 1 0) = 0
A1(1 0 1) = 1 A2(1 0 1) = 0.5 A3(1 0 1) = 0.5
A1(0 1 1) = 1 A2(0 1 1) = 0.5 A3(0 1 1) = 1.
This gives the following digraph for the Markov chain:
∅
1 2 3
12 13 23
123
1
2
1
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
4
1
4
1
4 1
2
Clearly, {1, 12} is a terminal class, but not reduced to a singleton. A2 has influential
players 1 and 3, so condition (iv) is satisfied.
4.2 The general result
We turn to the study of terminal classes not necessarily reduced to a single state.
Theorem 2. Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model, with aggregation func-
tions A1, . . . , An. Then terminal classes are:
(i) either singletons {S}, S ∈ 2N ,
(ii) or cycles of nonempty sets {S1, . . . , Sk} of any length 2 ≤ k ≤
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
(and there-
fore they are periodic of period k) with the condition that all sets are pairwise
incomparable (by inclusion)
13
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(iii) or collections C of nonempty sets with the property that C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cp, where
each subcollection Cj is a Boolean lattice [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ], Sj 6= ∅, Sj ∪Kj 6= N , and
at least one Kj is nonempty.
We call cyclic terminal classes those terminal classes of the second type and regular
terminal classes those of the third type. Regular terminal classes can be periodic (see
Example 6 below). Regular terminal classes formed by a single Boolean lattice [S, S ∪K]
are called Boolean terminal classes.
(see proof in the appendix)
We give some comments on this result. Example 5 shows the existence of regular
terminal classes. The existence of cyclic terminal classes was already remarked by Aracena
et al. (2004) for the case of regular aggregation functions, together with the condition of
incomparability among sets in the cycle. We know by Sperner’s lemma that the longest
possible sequence of incomparable sets in 2N has length
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
, hence the upper limit
of length. The next proposition is an easy result adapted from Aracena et al. (2004)
showing how to construct cyclic classes of maximal length.
Proposition 1. Let S := {S0, S1, . . . , Sp−1}, p ≥ 2, be a sequence of sets, pairwise
incomparable, of maximal length. Let Sc be the complementary sequence, i.e., Sc =
2N \ S, ordered with inclusion (increasingly). Let A1, . . . , An be aggregation functions
satisfying:
Ai(1Sj) = 1, ∀i ∈ Sj+1, ∀j = 0, . . . , p− 2
Ai(1Sj) = 0, ∀i 6∈ Sj+1, ∀j = 0, . . . , p− 2
Ai(1Sp−1) = 1, ∀i ∈ S0
Ai(1Sp−1) = 0, ∀i 6∈ S0
Ai(1T ) =
{
1, ∀i ∈ N, if ∃S ∈ S, S ⊂ T
0, ∀i ∈ N, if ∃S ∈ S, S ⊃ T
, ∀T ∈ Sc.
Then S is a cyclic class of length p of maximal length.
Cyclic classes are not the only case of periodic terminal classes, as the following
example shows.
Example 6. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the following aggregation functions:
A(1 0 0) = A(1 1 0) = (0 x 1)
A(0 0 1) = A(0 1 1) = (1 x 0)
A(0 1 0) = A(0 0 0) = (0 0 0)
A(1 0 1) = A(1 1 1) = (1 1 1)
with arbitrary 0 < x < 1. Then {1, 3, 12, 23} forms a periodic terminal class of period 2
(see Figure 5, left). Now consider the following aggregation functions:
A(1 0 0) = A(1 1 0) = (0 0 1)
A(0 0 1) = (1 x 0)
A(0 1 0) = A(0 0 0) = (0 0 0)
A(1 0 1) = A(0 1 1) = A(1 1 1) = (1 1 1)
with arbitrary 0 < x < 1. Then {1, 3, 12} is a periodic class of period 2 with 3 sets.
14
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∅1 3 2
12 23 13
123
∅
1 3 2
12 23 13
123
Figure 5: Examples of a periodic terminal class
Generally speaking, to construct a periodic regular terminal class of period k, one
needs k pairwise disjoint subcollections [Sj, Sj ∪Kj ], j = 1, . . . , k, with the usual restric-
tions on the Sj, Kj’s, and defines Ai(1S) = 1 if i ∈ Sj+1, Ai(1S) = x ∈ ]0, 1[ if i ∈ Kj+1,
and 0 otherwise, for all S ∈ [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ], identifying k + 1 with 1. Note that there is no
need to have the Kj’s of equal size (see Figure 5, right).
4.3 Regular terminal classes
Let us find some sufficient conditions so that regular terminal classes cannot exist. First
we set some notations. A regular terminal class has the form C =
⋃p
k=1[Sk, Sk∪Kk], with
the restrictions on Sk, Kk as in Theorem 2. Let us introduce the lower and upper bounds
of C:
S∗ =
p⋂
k=1
Sk, S
∗ =
p⋃
k=1
(Sk ∪Kk).
Clearly, [S∗, S
∗] ⊇ C. Note that S∗ \S∗ 6= ∅ since C is not a singleton, but S∗ = ∅, S
∗ = N
are possible (see Figure 5, left). If S∗ 6= ∅ and S
∗ 6= N , we say that the class is normal.
Theorem 3. There is no normal regular terminal class if there is no subgraph S of
GA1,...,An satisfying the following two conditions:
(i) There is no ingoing arc into S
(ii) There exists an agent i ∈ N \S which is not related to S, i.e., there is no path from
an agent in S to i.
(see proof in the appendix)
We make some comments on this result.
• Consider a Boolean terminal class [S, S∪K]. It means that no consensus is reached,
but all agents in S agree to say ‘yes’, while all agents in N \ (S ∪K) agree to say
‘no’. The agents in K oscillate between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in all possibles ways, without
ending. If there are several Boolean lattices in the class, the interpretation is more
complex, and depends on how exactly are the transitions between the lattices.
15
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• The contraposition of Theorem 3 is interesting as well: if there is a normal regular
class with upper and lower bounds S∗, S∗, then the subgraph S∗ has no ingoing arc,
and the set of agents which are not related to S∗ by some path outgoing from S∗ is
exactly N \ S∗ (see proof of Theorem 3). It clearly shows that S∗ forms an isolated
group, receiving no influence, and influencing only the agents in S∗ \S∗. Hence, S
∗
forms a subsociety, ruled by S∗.
• There are two simple particular cases where regular terminal classes cannot occur:
when GA1,...,An is strongly connected, or when there exists one agent who is influ-
ential for all agents. GA1,...,An strongly connected means that more or less directly,
all agents are influential for all agents, therefore a dichotomy among agents cannot
occur. Also, if one agent is influential for all the others, a consensus will finally
emerge around this agent.
• A slight adaptation of the proof permits to write a sufficient condition for regular
terminal classes with either S∗ = ∅ or S
∗ = N : there is no regular class with
S∗ = ∅, S
∗ 6= N (respectively, with S∗ 6= ∅, S
∗ = N) if there is no subgraph without
outgoing arc (respectively, without ingoing arc). However, these conditions are very
strong, therefore of little use. Note that there is no way to exclude regular classes
with S∗ = ∅ and S
∗ = N by imposing some conditions on influential players (this
is clear from Lemma 5 in the appendix).
4.4 Cyclic terminal classes
We turn to the study of cyclic classes.
Lemma 1. Two simple (but strong) sufficient conditions to forbidding any cyclic terminal
class are:
(i) There exists j ∈ N such that Aj takes values 0,1 only for ∅, N .
(ii) There exists j ∈ N such that all agents are influential for Aj.
Proof. (i) Because of Aj , for no set S 6= ∅, N , there can be a transition to a set T with
probability 1, which forbids the existence of cycles.
(ii) If all agents are influential in Aj , then 0 < Aj(1i) < 1 for all i ∈ N . Indeed,
1 = Aj(1i) ≤ Aj(1N\k) for any k 6= i, contradicting the fact that k is influential in
Aj . Similarly, 0 < Aj(1N\i) < 1 holds for any i ∈ N . It follows by monotonicity
that Aj(1S) 6= 0, 1 for all S 6= ∅, N , which by (i) proves the result.
Let us try to refine these conditions. The following lemma is fundamental.
Lemma 2. Suppose j is influential in Ai. Then there is no cyclic class containing con-
secutive coalitions S1, S2 (in this order) such that S1 ∋ j and S2 6∋ i, or S1 6∋ j and S2 ∋ i.
(put differently: suppose there is a cyclic class with S1, S2 consecutive. Then Ai cannot
have an influential player j ∈ N \ S1 if i ∈ S2, or an influential player j ∈ S1 if i 6∈ S2).
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Proof. Since S2 is the successor of S1 in the cycle, we have Ai(1S1) = 1 if i ∈ S2 and
0 otherwise. Suppose that j ∈ S1 is influential in Ai with i 6∈ S2. Then 0 < Ai(1j) ≤
Ai(1S1) = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, if j 6∈ S1 is influential in Ai with i ∈ S2, we have
1 = Ai(1S1) ≤ Ai(1N\j) < 1, again a contradiction.
An easy consequence is the following.
Corollary 1. If i is influential in Ai for all i ∈ N , there is no cyclic class.
Proof. From Lemma 2, i influential in Ai forbids any cycle with consecutive S1, S2 such
that S1 ∋ i and S2 6∋ i, or S1 6∋ i and S2 ∋ i. Since S1, S2 must be incomparable, S1 = {i}
is ruled out, as well as S1 = N \ i. Take S1 ⊂ N , S1 6= ∅. Then S2 = L ∪ T , with
L ⊆ N \ S1, L 6= ∅ and T ⊆ S1. Take i ∈ S1. The fact that i is influential in Ai forbids
T 6∋ i, for all L. Since this holds for all i ∈ S1, it follows that no T is possible, hence no
S2.
4.5 Influential coalitions
While influential players provide a simple and intuitive way to describe the properties of
aggregation functions in terms of influence, they can provide only sufficient conditions,
which may become far too restrictive to be of interest. Intuitively speaking, the more
agents the less likely a single agent can be influential, which implies that the previous
results are of little use in case of a large number of agents. Therefore, we propose a
generalization of the notion of influential agent.
Definition 3. Let Ai be the aggregation function of agent i. A nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N is influential in Ai if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) Ai(1S) > 0 and Ai(1N\S) < 1
(ii) For all S ′ ⊂ S, either Ai(1S′) = 0 or Ai(1N\S′) = 1.
We make some comments on this definition.
• The first condition says that the opinion of coalition S, when unanimous, matters
for agent i. Indeed, if agents in S say ‘yes’ and every other agent says ‘no’, then
agent i has a positive probability to say ‘yes’. Similarly, if the set of ‘no’ voters is
S, then agent i has a positive probability to say ‘no’. The second condition merely
says that no subcoalition of S satisfies the first condition, which means that S is
truly influential, i.e., it has no superfluous agent.
• The previous definition of an agent influential in Ai is clearly a particular case of
this definition.
• By the second condition, the set of influential coalitions form an antichain in 2N
(i.e., they are pairwise incomparable by inclusion).
• The notion of influential coalition is close to and generalizes followers and kernels
of the deterministic model of influence (see Section 2). Let A be Boolean (i.e., the
influence function B is deterministic). Suppose that S is influential for i. This
17
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implies Ai(1S) = 1 and Ai(1N\S) = 0. By monotonicity, it follows that Ai(1S′) = 1
and Ai(1N\S′) = 0 for any S
′ ⊇ S, which is equivalent to say that i is a follower
of S. The converse is false however, since condition (ii) above may not be satisfied
when i is a follower of S.
On the other hand, if S is a kernel, then it is influential for some i. Observe however
that the converse is not true, since it may be the case that if S is influential for i,
a proper subset S ′ of it may be influential for some j 6= i.
Hence a generalization of the follower function for the stochastic case could be:
FA(S) = {i ∈ N | ∃S
′ ⊆ S such that S ′ influential for i}
and S is a kernel if FA(S) 6= ∅ and S
′ ⊂ S implies FA(S) = ∅.
Definition 4. We say that the aggregation function Ai of agent i is exhaustive if Ai(1S) =
0 for some S ⊂ N if and only if Ai(1N\S) = 1.
It means that if agent i does not take into account the opinion of S (either ‘yes’ or
‘no’), he should then follow the opinion of N \ S. Observe that in Example 5, A1, A3 are
not exhaustive. Examples of exhaustive and nonexhaustive functions will be given below.
The next result shows that the notion of influential coalition can fully describe terminal
states.
Theorem 4. Suppose that all aggregation functions Ai, i ∈ N are exhaustive. Take
S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. Then S cannot be a terminal state if and only if, either there exist
S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S such that S ′ is influential for i, or there exist S ′ ⊆ S, i 6∈ S such that
S ′ is influential for i.
(see proof in the appendix)
A similar result holds for Boolean terminal classes.
Theorem 5. Suppose that all aggregation functions Ai, i ∈ N are exhaustive. Consider
an interval [S, S ∪ K], with nonempty S, K ⊂ N , which forms a class. Then [S, S ∪K]
cannot be a Boolean terminal class if and only if, either there exists S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S
such that S ′ is influential for i, or there exists S ′ ⊆ S ∪ K, i 6∈ S ∪ K such that S ′ is
influential for i.
(see proof in the appendix)
Unfortunately, it does not seem possible to find simple conditions for (general) regular
classes with the help of influential coalitions.
Definition 5. An aggregation function Ai is said to be decomposable if all its influential
coalitions are singletons.
From Theorem 4, we can deduce the following.
Corollary 2. Suppose that all aggregation functions Ai, i ∈ N are decomposable and
exhaustive. Then there is no other terminal state than the trivial states if and only if the
indirected influential graph G0A1,...,An is connected.
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Proof. Since the Ai’s are exhaustive, Theorem 4 ensures that the existence of terminal
states depends solely on influential coalitions, which reduces to influential players by
decomposability. But we have shown in the proof of Theorem 1 (iv) that ruling out all
nontrivial terminal states by influential players is equivalent to have G0A1,...,An connected.
Corollary 3. Suppose that all aggregation functions Ai, i ∈ N are decomposable and
exhaustive. Then there is no Boolean terminal class if and only if there is no subgraph S
of the influential graph GA1,...,An such that there is no arc ingoing to S, and there exists
an agent i ∈ N \ S which is not related to S.
Proof. As above, decomposability and exhaustiveness ensure that the existence of Boolean
terminal classes depends only on influential players. Therefore, condition (B) (see the
proof of Theorem 3 in the appendix) becomes necessary and sufficient (note that all
Boolean classes are normal), which in turn is equivalent by Theorem 3 to the required
conditions on the graph of influence.
4.6 Some families of aggregation functions and their properties
We exhibit now important families of aggregation functions (see Grabisch et al. (2009)).
Proposition 2. The family of generalized weighted means, defined by
Mf (x1, . . . , xn) = f
−1
( n∑
i=1
wif(xi)
)
, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]
n,
with wi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
∑n
i=1 wi = 1, f continuous automorphism on [0, 1], is a family
of decomposable and exhaustive aggregation functions.
Proof. Suppose that f(1) = 1 (the case f(1) = 0 works the same), and that S ⊂ N , |S| >
1 is influential. Then Mf (1S) = f
−1(
∑
i∈S wi) > 0, which is equivalent to
∑
i∈S wi > 0.
On the other hand, for any i ∈ S we have Mf (1i) = f
−1(wi) = 0, equivalent to wi = 0, a
contradiction.
Suppose that there exists S ⊆ N such that Mf (1S) = 0. By nonnegativity of the
weights wi, this is equivalent to wi = 0 for all i ∈ S. By the normalization condition this
implies
∑
i6∈S wi = 1, hence Mf (1N\S) = 1.
When f = Id, we recover the weighted arithmetic mean as in the DeGroot model.
Note that i is influential if and only if wi > 0.
The previous family is in some sense a family of quasi-linear aggregation functions.
We introduce now a very different family since it is of the min-max type: the family of
k-order statistics. The kth-order statistic for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is OSk(x) = x(k), where
x ∈ [0, 1]n and x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ · · · ≤ x(n), i.e., OSk(x) is the kth smallest coordinate of
x. This family contains three important particular cases: OS1 is the minimum, OSn is
the maximum, and if n is odd, OS⌊n
2
⌋+1 is the median. Moreover, when restricted to 0-1
inputs as here, order statistics can model majority functions: the majority function with
threshold q for some q ∈ {⌊n
2
⌋+ 1, ⌊n
2
⌋+ 2, . . . , n} is exactly OSn−q+1.
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kth-order statistics are not exhaustive, for any k = 1, . . . , n, except in one case.
Indeed, if k ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋, we have OSk(1S) = OSk(1N\S) = 0 for S ⊆ N such that |S| = k.
If k > ⌊n
2
⌋, it suffices to take S such that |S| = ⌊n
2
⌋. Then, OSk(1S) = 0 = OSk(1N\S),
unless n is odd and k = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1. In the latter case, it can be checked that OSk is
exhaustive.
Suppose that agent i has OSk as aggregation function. As it can be easily checked,
any set S ⊆ N with |S| = n− k + 1 is influential for i if k ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋, while for k > ⌊n
2
⌋, one
must have |S| = k; only those sets are influential. In summary, we have shown:
Proposition 3. Consider OSk for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then:
(i) OSk is not exhaustive, unless n is odd and k = ⌊
n
2
⌋ + 1, the latter case being the
classical majority function with an odd number of agents (no tie). Consequently,
min, max, median as well as other types of majority functions are not exhaustive.
(ii) If Ai = OSk, then the collection of influential sets for i is {S ⊆ N s.t. |S| = n−k+1}
when k ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋, and {S ⊆ N s.t. |S| = k} when k > ⌊n
2
⌋. Consequently, no OSk is
decomposable, and the only influential set for min and max is N .
We briefly mention a third family of interest, namely the ordered weighted averages
(OWA), which are nothing else than convex combinations of order statistics:
OWA(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
wix(i), (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]
n,
with wi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 wi = 1. It is easy to see that these aggregation functions are not
exhaustive since the order statistics are not. By contrast, they are decomposable if and
only if all weights are positive. OWA functions are used to model “soft” majority, like
“most of people say yes”.
5 Related literature on aggregation models
The idea of the aggregation model where each agent aggregates the opinions of the others
is not new, since it can be traced back at least to the model of DeGroot. We recall that
in this model the opinion of agents is a number in [0, 1], and that the aggregation is
done through a weighted arithmetic mean (convex combination). Also, the aggregated
value is directly the opinion of the agent, which shows the fundamental difference with
our model. In fact, our proposal is closer to the one of Asavathiratham (2000), although
there are important differences in the dynamic aspect. In this model, the probability of
an agent to say ‘yes’ is, as in the DeGroot model, a convex combination of the opinions
of the other agents, where ‘yes’ is coded by 1, and ‘no’ by 0.
We are not aware of other studies in the field of influence and social networks, us-
ing other means of aggregating opinions, nor considering a general class of aggregation
function like in our model. It is however possible to find related studies in discrete math-
ematics concerning mainly Boolean functions, often applied to bioinformatics. There is
a remarkable paper by Aracena et al. (2004), that we have already cited above. Here,
functions from {0, 1, . . . , m− 1}n to {0, 1, . . . , m− 1}n are considered, which corresponds
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in our framework to n agents having m possible answers, and the aggregation gives di-
rectly the opinions of the agents after influence (hence the case m = 2 is exactly our
deterministic influence model). Aracena et al. study in particular the cyclic terminal
classes, supposing some properties, like monotonicity of the aggregation functions and
symmetry of the graph of influence. Re´my et al. (2008) provides also an interesting study
of cyclic terminal classes when the aggregation functions are Boolean functions, with the
restriction that transitions are of the type S → S ∪ i or S → S \ i, for S ⊆ N .
Lastly, we mention Mueller-Frank (2010) who provides a study of convergence applied
to non-Bayesian learning in social networks. Here, aggregation functions which are con-
tinuous and a have a special property called “constricting” are considered. Supposing a
graph depicting neighboring relations among agents, Ai is constricting if Ai(x) is com-
prised between the minimum and maximum of the xj , j ∈ Ni ∪ i, where Ni is the set of
neighbors of i. It is shown that for such functions, the process converges to a fixed point.
As it can be seen, all these studies consider particular cases of aggregation functions,
and up to our knowledge there is no general study as the one we have undertaken in this
paper.
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Appendix - Proofs of theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
We need first the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider the following rule R:
j influential in Ai rules out every coalition S ∈ 2
N such that S ∋ i and S 6∋ j.
Then rule R rules out every coalition S ∈ 2N , S 6= ∅, N if and only if the graph of
influence GA1,...,An is strongly connected.
Proof. Sufficiency: we suppose that GA1,...,An is strongly connected and we consider a
nonempty set S ⊂ N . Take all arcs of GA1,...,An having their terminal endpoint in S, and
call I(S) ⊆ N the set of initial endpoints of these arcs. Suppose that I(S) 6= S. Then
there is an arc (j, i) with i ∈ S and j 6∈ S. Hence S is ruled out by R. Suppose on
the contrary that I(S) = S. Then from nodes of S, it is not possible to attain nodes in
N \ S 6= ∅, a contradiction with the connectivity hypothesis.
Necessity: ∀i ∈ N , there must be an arc (j, i) for some j 6= i, otherwise S = {i} is
not ruled out by R. Hence in GA1,...,An, each node has a predecessor. Therefore, for each
nonempty S ⊂ N , we define I(S), the set of initial endpoints of the arcs whose terminal
endpoints are in S, and I(S) 6= ∅.
Suppose there exists a set S ⊂ N such that S = I(S). Then S is not ruled out by
R since there is no arc (j, i) with i ∈ S and j 6∈ S. Consequently, no such S exists. We
claim that this implies that GA1,...,An is strongly connected. Indeed, suppose it is not
true. Then there exist distinct nodes i, j such that R(i), the set of nodes which can reach
i (connected by a directed path) does not contain j, or R(j) 6∋ i. Then R(i) (or R(j))
would satisfy R(i) 6= N and I(R(i)) = R(i), a contradiction with the assumption.
Proof of Theorem 1
(i) Since Ai(1, . . . , 1) = 1 for every aggregation function, when s = 1N , we have x =
(A1(1N), . . . , An(1N)) = (1, . . . , 1). Therefore the next state is N with probability
1, which proves that N is a terminal state. Now from the property Ai(0, . . . , 0) = 0,
∀i ∈ N , we deduce similarly that ∅ is a terminal state.
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(ii) Take any S 6= N, ∅. It is a terminal state if and only if bS,S = 1 and consequently
bS,T = 0 for all T 6= S. This is equivalent to (A1(1S), . . . , An(1S)) = 1S, i.e.,
Ai(1S) = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise.
(iii) Clear from (ii).
(iv) Suppose that j is influential in Ai. Then Ai(1j) > 0, and by monotonicity Ai(1S) >
0 for all S ∋ j. By (ii), this rules out every S such that S ∋ j and S 6∋ i. Similarly,
Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1N\j) < 1 for all S 6∋ j. By (ii) again, this rules out any S containing
i but not j. In summary, the following rule R′ holds:
j influential in Ai rules out any S ∈ 2
N such that [S 6∋ j and S ∋ i] or [S ∋ j and S 6∋ i].
Consider GA1,...,An the graph of influence with all arcs reversed. Then the rule R
′ on
GA1,...,An is equivalent to the rule R of Lemma 3 on GA1,...,An ∪GA1,...,An = G
0
A1,...,An
.
Therefore, ruling out every nonempty S ⊂ N by R′ is equivalent by Lemma 3 to
have G0A1,...,An connected.
Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout this section we use the convenient shorthand
(1S, xK) := (0 · · ·0 1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
x1x2 · · ·xk︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
)
for vectors in [0, 1]n. The following straightforward lemma is central for proving the
result.
Lemma 4. From each set S ∈ 2N , the number of possible transitions is of the form 2k,
for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, where k is the number of components in A(1S) different from
0 and 1. More precisely, if A(1S) = (1T , xK) with xi ∈ ]0, 1[ for all i ∈ K, then S has a
transition to any set in the Boolean lattice [T, T ∪K] := {S ′ ∈ 2N | T ⊆ S ′ ⊆ T ∪K}.
Proof of Theorem 2 Consider a terminal class C, and S ∈ C. Unless C is reduced to a
single state, S cannot be empty because from the empty set there is no other transition
than to itself, and so C would not be a class. One and only one of the following cases can
happen:
(i) A(1S) = 1S. Then S is a terminal state, i.e., C = {S}.
(ii) A(1S) = 1T , T 6= S. There is transition from S to T with certainty. If for
all sets in C the transitions are certain, the only possibility is that C is a cycle
S → T → · · · → S.
(iii) A(1S) = (1T , xK), with xi ∈ ]0, 1[ for any i ∈ K, |K| = k. From Lemma 4, there
are 2k transitions, which form the Boolean lattice [T, T ∪ K]. Then necessarily,
[T, T ∪K] is included in C, for if some set L ∈ [T, T ∪K] does not belong to C, there
would be a transition from S to L, i.e., an arc outgoing from the class, contradicting
that it is a terminal class.
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0. The case of terminal states has been studied in Theorem 1.
1. We study the second case (cycles), and put C = {S1, . . . , Sk}. If the sequence
S1, . . . , Sk with k ≥ 2 is a cycle, we must have:
A(1S1) = 1S2
A(1S2) = 1S3
... =
...
A(1Sk) = 1S1 .
Suppose that the vectors 1S1 , . . . , 1Sk are incomparable (i.e., no relation of inclusion occurs
among the Si’s). Then no condition due to the nondecreasingness of the Ai’s applies, and
therefore there is no contradiction among the above equations. Conversely, suppose there
exist Si, Sj in the sequence such that Si ⊆ Sj . By monotonicity of A this implies that
Si+1 = A(Si) ⊆ A(Sj) = Sj+1, etc. This causes a contradiction since we finally arrive at
Si ⊂ Sj ⊆ · · · ⊆ Si (letting Sk+1 := S1, etc.). By Sperner’s lemma, we know that the
longest possible sequence of incomparable sets has length
(
n
⌊n
2
⌋
)
, hence the bound on k.
2. We suppose that C is a terminal class, which is neither a cycle nor a singleton.
Then there exists a set S ′ ∈ C with several possible transitions, i.e., A(1S′) = (1S1, xK ′1),
with xi ∈ ]0, 1[, for all i ∈ K
′
1. We have S1 6= ∅, otherwise a transition to ∅ would be
possible, i.e., C is not terminal. Similarly, S1 ∪ K
′
1 6= N , otherwise a transition to N
would be possible. There may be several such S ′ with same S1 but different K
′
1. Call
S one of them with the largest K ′1, and put A(1S) = (1S1, xK1), |K1| =: k1. Then the
Boolean lattice C1 := [S1, S1 ∪K1] is the set of transitions from S and is included in C.
2.1. Suppose that for any T ∈ C1, we have A(1T ) = (1S1, x
T
K1
), with xTi ∈ [0, 1],
i ∈ K1. Then all transitions from a set of C1 remain in C1. It follows from the assumption
on C that C1 is a terminal class, and therefore C = C1. Note that monotonicity of the
aggregation functions entails that for any T, T ′ ∈ C1,
T ⊆ T ′ ⇔ xTK1 ≤ x
T ′
K1 ,
i.e., the vectors (xTK1)T∈C1 form a Boolean lattice isomorphic to [S1, S1 ∪K1].
Note that the xTK1 must be such that C1 is strongly connected. This is achieved, e.g.,
if xTi ∈ ]0, 1[.
2.2 Suppose on the contrary that C 6= C1, implying that there is some set S
′ ∈ C
with a different transition, say A(1S) = (1S2, xK ′2), with S2 6⊇ S1 or S2 ∪K
′
2 6⊆ S1 ∪K1.
Again, among all S ′ with same S2 but different K
′
2, choose S with largest K
′
2 and put
A(1S) = (1S2, xK2), |K2| =: k2. Then the Boolean lattice C2 := [S2, S2 ∪K2] is the set of
transitions from S and is included in C.
Examining the transitions of all sets in C we eventually conclude that C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪
· · · ∪ Cp, where each Cj is a Boolean lattice [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ], defined as above. Note that at
least one Kj must be nonempty, otherwise each set has only one transition, and then the
only way to have a class is to have a cycle, a case which is excluded here.
There are two cases concerning transitions among the subcollections Cj . Let us take
w.l.o.g. C1 as starting point.
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2.2.1. Suppose that for all T ∈ C1 we have A(1T ) = (1S2, x
T
K2
), with xTi ∈ [0, 1],
i ∈ K2, i.e., from any set of C1 there are only transitions to members of C2. Note that in
this case there is no special relation between S1 and S2.
2.2.2. Suppose on the contrary that in C1 there is a set S with transition to, say, C2,
and another one T with transition to C3. Then monotonicity relations among the sets in
C1 induce monotonicity relations between S2, S3 and S2 ∪K2, S3 ∪K3.
If S ⊂ T , then monotonicity of the aggregation functions entails A(1S) ≤ A(1T ).
Supposing A(1S) = (1S2, x
S
K2
), xSi ∈ ]0, 1[ for all i in K2 and similarly for T , this implies
S2 ⊆ S3, S2 ∪K2 ⊆ S3 ∪K3 and x
S
i ≤ x
T
i for all i in K2 ∩K3.
If S and T are incomparable, then S2 and S3 can be also incomparable. In this case,
for S∩T and S∪T the transitions must satisfy A(1S∩T ) ≤ (1S2∩S3 , x
S∩T
K2∩K3
), and similarly
for A(1S∪T ). Note that necessarily S2 ∩ S3 6= ∅ and S2 ∪ K2 ∪ S3 ∪ K3 6= N , otherwise
the class would not be terminal. Also, from C1 there will be transitions to 4 different
subcollections, with bottom elements S2, S3, a subset of S2∩S3 (say, S2∧3) and a superset
of S2 ∪ S3, say S2∨3, respectively. Observe that the union of these subcollections has a
least and a greatest element, which are S2∧3 and S2∨3, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 3
The next lemma is fundamental.
Lemma 5. Suppose that C is a regular terminal class, with lower and upper bounds
S∗, S
∗. Then Ai cannot have an influential player j ∈ N \ S∗ whenever i ∈ S∗, or an
influential player j ∈ S∗ whenever i ∈ N \ S∗.
Proof. Suppose that C is a regular terminal class. Then for all S ′ ∈ C, we have
Ai(1S′) =
{
1, if i ∈ S∗ (∗)
0, if i 6∈ S∗ (∗∗)
Suppose i ∈ S∗ and Ai has an influential player j ∈ N \S∗. Take S
′ ∈ C such that j 6∈ S ′.
This is always possible since necessarily one of the Sk’s does not contain j (for if j ∈ Sk
for all k = 1, . . . , p, then j ∈ S∗). This implies 1 > Ai(1N\j) ≥ Ai(1S′), which contradicts
(*).
Suppose now that i 6∈ S∗ and Ai has an influential player j ∈ S
∗. Take S ′ ∈ C such
that j ∈ S ′. Again this is always possible since j ∈ S∗ implies j ∈ Sk ∪ Kk for some k.
Then Ai(1S′) ≥ Ai(1j) > 0, which contradicts (**).
By applying the above lemma to every pair S∗, S
∗ with S∗ 6= ∅, S
∗ 6= N , one can
obtain a sufficient condition (B) for forbidding any normal regular terminal class not
reduced to the trivial terminal classes.
Condition (B): for any ∅ 6= S ⊂ N , any S ∪ K 6= N , K 6= ∅, there exist
i ∈ S, j 6∈ S or i 6∈ S ∪K, j ∈ S ∪K such that j is influential in Ai.
We prove that condition (B) is equivalent to the conditions of Theorem 3.
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Proof of Theorem 3 We consider the following rule R′′, which is in fact Lemma 5:
j influential in Ai rules out every regular class with lower and upper bounds
S∗, S
∗, such that i ∈ S∗, j 6∈ S∗ (arc going into S∗) or i 6∈ S
∗, j ∈ S∗ (arc
outgoing from S∗).
We prove that rule R′′ rules out all normal regular classes with lower and upper bounds
S∗, S
∗ if and only if there is no subgraph S of GA1,...,An without ingoing arcs, for which
there exists i ∈ N \ S such that no path from a node in S to i exists.
Necessity: Suppose such an S and i exist, and consider R(i), the set of nodes that
can reach i by a path. Note that R(i) ∩ S = ∅. Then a regular terminal class with lower
and upper bounds S, N \R(i) is possible, because S is not ruled out (no ingoing arrow),
and N \ R(i) can be ruled out only by an arc going into R(i), which does not exist by
definition of R(i).
Sufficiency: take any normal regular class with bounds S∗, S
∗, i.e., with 1 ≤ |S∗| <
n − 1 and 2 ≤ |S∗| < n. If S∗ has an ingoing arc, it is ruled out by R
′′. If it has no
ingoing arc, then by hypothesis every node outside S∗ is linked to S∗ by a path. Since
N \ S∗ is always nonempty, taking any node i in N \ S∗, there is a path from S∗ to i,
hence necessarily an arc outgoing from S∗. Therefore, S∗ is ruled out by R′′.
Proof of Theorem 4
Sufficiency: Take S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S, and suppose that S ′ is influential in Ai. Then
Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1N\S) < 1, hence S is not a terminal class by Theorem 1 (ii). Now, suppose
that S ′ ⊆ S, i 6∈ S, S ′ influential in Ai. Then 0 < Ai(1S′) ≤ Ai(1S), which implies that
S is not a terminal class.
Necessity: Suppose that S is not a terminal state. Then by Theorem 1 (ii), either
there is some i ∈ S such that Ai(1S) < 1 or some i 6∈ S such that Ai(1S) > 0.
Suppose that for some i ∈ S, Ai(1S) < 1. Take the largest S
′ ⊇ S such that
Ai(1S′) < 1. We claim that N \ S
′ is influential for i. Indeed, we have Ai(1S′) < 1.
Also, Ai(1N\S′) = 0 would imply by exhaustivity of Ai that Ai(1S′) = 1, a contradiction
with the definition of S ′. Therefore, Ai(1N\S′) > 0. Finally, we have for all S
′′ ⊃ S ′,
Ai(1S′′) = 1, and the claim is proved.
Suppose now that for some i 6∈ S, Ai(1S) > 0. Take the smallest S
′ ⊆ S such that
Ai(1S′) > 0. Then S
′ is influential for i. Indeed, Ai(1S′) > 0, and by exhaustivity of Ai
we must have Ai(1N\S′) < 1. Finally, for every S
′′ ⊂ S ′, Ai(1S′′) = 0 holds.
Proof of Theorem 5
Sufficiency: Take S ′ ⊆ N \ S, i ∈ S, and suppose that S ′ is influential in Ai. Then
Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1N\S′) < 1, hence [S, S ∪ K] cannot be a Boolean terminal class, for any
K. Now, suppose that S ′ ⊆ S ∪K, i 6∈ S ∪K, S ′ influential in Ai. Then 0 < Ai(1S′) ≤
Ai(1S∪K), which implies that [S, S ∪K] is not a terminal class.
Necessity: Suppose that the class [S, S ∪ K] is not terminal. Then there exists S ′ ∈
[S, S ∪K] such that either Ai(1S′) < 1 for some i ∈ S, or Ai(1S′) > 0 for some i 6∈ S ∪K.
Therefore, we can proceed exactly like in the proof of Theorem 4.
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